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Abstract
J. L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument for atheism (2015) assumes that God’s 
perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite person is consistent with their 
perpetual flourishing. However, I argue that if Aquinas-Stump’s account of the 
nature of love is true, then any finite person flourishes the most only if they attain the 
greatest degree of union among God and all relevant parties. Moreover, if Humean 
externalism is true, then any finite person might not have their greatest attainable 
degree of union among God and all relevant parties, as soon as possible, unless God 
sacrifices some time in the union—not the whole union—with them. Accordingly, 
God’s perpetual openness might not be consistent with the future flourishing of any 
finite person—from which it follows that a crucial assumption of the hiddenness 
argument might not be true.
Keywords Schellenberg · Hiddenness · Nonresistant nonbelief · Atheism · Aquinas-
Stump · Love · Motivational externalism
Rick Deckard (Blade Runner 2049): Sometimes to love someone, you got to be a stranger.
Introduction
Since the publication of J. L. Schellenberg’s book, Divine Hiddenness and Human 
Reason (1993), “divine hiddenness” has come to refer to the phenomenon of non-
resistant nonbelief (Schellenberg 2007, 204 and 226). Any finite person is a non-
resistant nonbeliever if and only if they fulfill three conditions. First, they must 
possess the cognitive and affective faculties needed to participate in a personal 
relationship with God. Second, they must lack the belief that God exists. Third, 
the absence of theistic belief must not be the result of their own psychological or 
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behavioral opposition towards God, or personal relationship with God, or any of 
the apparent implications of such a relationship (Schellenberg 2008).
J. L. Schellenberg has pioneered a divine hiddenness argument to believe that 
nonresistant nonbelief would not exist if there were a God (Schellenberg 2017, 1):
(S1) If a perfectly loving God exists, then there exists a God who is always 
open to a personal relationship with any finite person.
(S2) If there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with 
any finite person, then no finite person is ever nonresistantly in a state of 
nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists.
(S3) If a perfectly loving God exists, then no finite person is ever nonre-
sistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. 
[HS (S1), (S2)]
(S4) Some finite persons are or have been nonresistantly in a state of nonbe-
lief in relation to the proposition that God exists.
(S5) No perfectly loving God exists. [MT (S3), (S4)]
(S6) If no perfectly loving God exists, then God does not exist.
(S7) God does not exist. [MP (S5), (S6)]
Premise (S1) maintains that a perfectly loving God (if such a God exists) is per-
petually open to a personal relationship with any finite person P, in a perfectly 
loving manner, such that there is nothing God does that prevents P from being 
able to participate in a personal relationship with God (Schellenberg 2016, 21). 
Schellenberg gives three reasons that support the truth of premise (S1). First, it is 
self-evident that a perfectly loving God, like the best human lover, would ensure 
that a personal relationship was always possible for those she loved. Moreover, 
our flourishing, which a perfectly loving God would always desire, would be 
immeasurably enhanced by a personal relationship with God (Schellenberg 1993, 
17–18). Finally, a perfectly loving God would value a personal relationship with 
any finite person for its own sake (Schellenberg 2016, 19).
Put simply; the idea of premise (S2) is that it is necessary to believe that God 
exists before someone can believe in God:
…[H]ow can I experience nature as the creature of God or hear God speak 
to me (interpreting it as God speaking) or consciously experience Divine 
forgiveness and support or feel grateful to God or experience God’s loving 
and inspiring presence and respond thereto in love and obedience and wor-
ship if I do not believe that there is a God (Schellenberg 2007, 204)?
Accordingly, given S1, any nonresistant finite person will always believe that 
God exists whenever they can participate in a personal relationship with God.
Premises (S1) and (S2) jointly entail sub-conclusion (S3), i.e., if a perfectly 
loving God exists, then no instances of nonresistant nonbelief would exist in this 
(or any possible) world.
Premise (S4) is an empirical premise that generalizes from four widely-
accepted examples of capable nonbelief to the conclusion that there is or has been 
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at least one nonresistant nonbeliever.1 After all, the probability is vanishingly 
small that all these hundreds of millions of capable nonbelievers are or have been 
resistant to relating personally to God.
Premises (S3) and (S4) jointly entail sub-conclusion (S5), i.e., no perfectly loving 
God exists.
Premise (S6) operates on the traditional Judeo-Christian-Islamic concept of God, 
which minimally includes the thesis that God is morally perfect; and in that connection, 
must be perfectly loving. Accordingly, if God exists, then that entails a perfectly loving 
God exists. Therefore, if no perfectly loving God exists, then God does not exist.
Premises (S5) and (S6) jointly entail main conclusion (S7), i.e., God does not exist.
Since sub-conclusions (S3) and (S5), and main conclusion (S7), follow deduc-
tively from the premises before them, the only question is: Are premises (S1), (S2), 
(S4), and (S6) true? In my judgment, Schellenberg has convincingly argued that 
premises (S2), (S4), and (S6) are true (Schellenberg 2015). Therefore, my critical 
appraisal of Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument will focus on premise (S1).
Premise (S1) assumes that God’s perpetual openness to a relationship with any 
finite person would not hinder the perpetual flourishing of all relevant parties, or any 
relationship that may exist or come to exist between them:
An important principle I have recently argued we should accept—call it the 
Openness Principle—has it that a loving person maintains openness to a rela-
tionship with the one she loves whenever she has the resources to accommo-
date the consequences of such openness…as premise 1 of the hiddenness argu-
ment has it… (Schellenberg 2017, 2). [So]…a lover may lack the resources to 
accommodate the possible consequences of openness, that is, to make them 
consistent with the flourishing of all relevant parties and of any relationship 
that may exist or come to exist between them. But since God is not such a 
lover, we may ignore this qualification hereafter (Schellenberg 2016, 20).
However, this background assumption of premise (S1) might not be true. Why? 
Because if Aquinas-Stump’s account of the nature of love is true, then any finite per-
son flourishes the most only if they attain the greatest degree of union among God 
and all relevant parties (i.e., self and others). Moreover, if Humean externalism is 
true, then any finite person might not have their greatest attainable degree of union 
among God and all relevant parties, as soon as possible (a.s.a.p.), unless God sacri-
fices some time in the union—not the whole union—with them.
Therefore, God’s perpetual openness to union with any finite person might hin-
der the flourishing of their future union among God and all relevant parties; and 
accordingly, hinder their future flourishing. Given that a perfectly loving God might 
not have the resources to accommodate this possible consequence of perpetual 
1 Schellenberg (2007, 228–242): (1) Former believers: Those who have lost the theistic faith they once 
had and earnestly wish to regain it. (2) Lifelong seekers: Honest seekers of truth who remain agnostics 
and atheists, including those whose search leads them to convert to non-theistic religions. (3) Converts 
to non-theistic religions: Theists who become adherents of non-theistic religions, or nonresisters who 
become adherents of non-theistic religions (sometimes because of non-theistic religious experiences). (4) 
Isolated non-theists: Hunter-gatherers prior to the advent of theistic concepts and beliefs, and members 
of cultures that lack the idea of a personal and perfectly loving God.
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openness, it follows that such a God might not be perpetually open to union with any 
(i.e., every) finite person. In that connection, premise (S1) might not be true.
For the sake of clarity, here is the standard form of the main argument I defend to 
believe that premise (S1) might not be true:
(A1) If a perfectly loving God exists, then such a God always intrinsically 
desires any finite person to have their greatest attainable flourishing a.s.a.p.
(A2) If a perfectly loving God exists who always intrinsically desires any finite 
person to have their greatest attainable flourishing a.s.a.p., then such a God 
always intrinsically desires any finite person to have their greatest attainable 
degree of union among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p.
Therefore,
(A3) If a perfectly loving God exists, then such a God always intrinsically 
desires any finite person to have their greatest attainable degree of union 
among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p. [HS (A1), (A2)]
(A4) If a perfectly loving God exists who always intrinsically desires any finite per-
son to have their greatest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant par-
ties a.s.a.p., then such a God always intrinsically desires any finite person to attain 
the state of wholeheartedly desiring to comply with what morality requires a.s.a.p.
Therefore,
(A5) If a perfectly loving God exists, then such a God always intrinsically 
desires any finite person to attain the state of wholeheartedly desiring to com-
ply with what morality requires a.s.a.p. [HS (A3), (A4)]
(A6) If a perfectly loving God exists who always intrinsically desires any finite 
person to attain the state of wholeheartedly desiring to comply with what moral-
ity requires a.s.a.p., then such a God always intrinsically desires to optimally 
sustain any nonresistant finite person’s global second-order desire to be moral.
Therefore,
(A7) If a perfectly loving God exists, then such a God always intrinsically 
desires to optimally sustain any nonresistant finite person’s global second-
order desire to be moral. [HS (A5), (A6)]
(A8) If a perfectly loving God exists who always intrinsically desires to opti-
mally sustain any nonresistant finite person’s global second-order desire to be 
moral, then such a God might derivatively desire to permit various types and 
tokens of nonresistant nonbelief for some time.
Therefore,
(A9) If a perfectly loving God exists, then such a God might derivatively 
desire to permit various types and tokens of nonresistant nonbelief for some 
time. [HS (A7), (A8)]
(A10) If a perfectly loving God exists who might derivatively desire to permit 
various types and tokens of nonresistant nonbelief for some time, then such a 
God might not be perpetually open to union with any finite person.
1 3
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Therefore,
(A11) If a perfectly loving God exists, then such a God might not be perpetu-
ally open to union with any finite person. [HS (A9), (A10)]
Notice that sub-conclusions (A3), (A5), (A7), and (A9), and main conclusion (A11), 
follow deductively from the premises before them. Also, notice that if main conclusion 
(A11) is true, then premise (S1) of Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument might have a 
true antecedent and a false consequent. In that connection, premise (S1) might not be 
true. As such, Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument might not show that atheism is true.
In the next section, I argue for the truth of premises (A1), (A2), (A4), and (A6) using 
Aquinas-Stump’s account of the nature of love. Then, I argue for the truth of premises 
(A8) and (A10) using Humean externalism. After that, the following two sections see a 
consideration of two objections to my main argument followed by a conclusion.
However, it is vital that I make three clarifications regarding my main argument 
above to avoid gratuitous confusion. First, I aim to undercut, rather than rebut, 
premise (S1) of Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument. Second, to the best of my 
knowledge, nobody has used Aquinas-Stump’s general account of love and Humean 
externalism, in the way I do, to develop an undercutting defeater of premise (S1). 
Third, I support premises (A1), (A2), (A4), (A6), (A8), and (A10) by reasoning 
“from above” (with abstract reflection on the nature of love and moral motivation). 
That is, if Aquinas-Stump’s account of love is true, then it is necessarily true (de 
dicto) because it encapsulates the nature of love. Moreover, if Humean externalism 
is true, then it is necessarily true (de dicto)—whether we have libertarian free will 
or not—because it encapsulates the nature of moral motivation. Therefore, I do not 
commit the familiarity fallacy that Schellenberg has repeatedly cautioned against, 
where someone takes assorted contingent facts about our world as unobjectionable 
givens when doing natural theology (Schellenberg 2007, 260–261).
Aquinas‑Stump’s account of the nature of love
Premise (A1)
Aquinas-Stump’s account of the nature of love requires two interconnected desires: 
(D1) the desire for the good of the beloved, and (D2) the desire for union with the 
beloved. The ultimate proper object and cause of these two desires is the good 
alone.2 Accordingly, the relevant implicit condition on each of the desires of love is 
‘for the sake of goodness’ rather than the ‘for its own sake’ Schellenberg appeals to 
in defense of premise (S1):
That is, if we ask the lover, “why do you want the good of the beloved?,’ or 
‘why do you want union with the beloved?,’ on Aquinas’s view the answer 
should not be ‘I just do; it’s a final end for me.’ Rather, the answer should 
be, ‘because it’s good’—because it is good that the beloved should have what 
2 This includes moral, non-moral, and metaphysical goodness (Stump 2010, 93).
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is good for him; because it is good that the lover should be united with the 
beloved… (Stump 2010, 93).
However, with regard to the first desire of love, I hasten to add that intrinsically 
desiring the good of the beloved may sometimes require the lover to derivatively 
desire the conditions that are necessary to promote the beloved’s future flourishing 
(Stump 2010, 93–94).
For example, suppose a pediatrician tells two loving parents that they must sleep 
train their six-month-old infant to promote his or her future flourishing. Further 
suppose that the pediatrician recommends to the parents that they use the Ferber 
method as the best way to sleep train their infant.3 Given their pediatrician’s recom-
mendation, and the well-established future benefits of the Ferber method, these lov-
ing parents elect to sleep train their infant using this method.
Given this background information, it can be argued that these loving parents intrin-
sically desire the true flourishing of their infant. At the same time, however, these lov-
ing parents only derivatively desire the conditions that are necessary for their infant 
to acquire the future benefits of such training—namely, they must remain hidden for 
a predetermined amount of time while their infant cries. Of course, one assumes that 
the appropriate use of the Ferber method is not an evil and will not cause short-term or 
long-term harm to an infant. Granting that assumption illustrates the further point that 
these parents can justifiably sleep train their infant, using the Ferber method, without 
needing the explicit or implicit consent of their child to do so (Stump 2010, Ch. 13).
Relatedly, if a perfectly loving God exists, then such a God always intrinsically 
desires the true good of any finite person. However, as I shall argue, that may some-
times require such a God to derivatively desire to permit nonresistant nonbelief for 
some time in order to promote the future flourishing of all relevant parties. I hasten 
to add that since the logic of the divine hiddenness argument under consideration 
does not involve any relationship between nonresistant nonbelief and facts about evil 
(Schellenberg 2007, 226) or pain and suffering (Schellenberg 2010, 8), considera-
tions of consent do not charitably arise as potential objections to my main argument. 
In what follows, I understand the desire for the good of the beloved as qualified by 
these remarks.
At present, here is the crucial point: if a perfectly loving God exists, then such a 
God always intrinsically desires any finite person to have their greatest attainable 
flourishing a.s.a.p. Consider two reasons in support of this conditional claim. First, 
it is self-evident. That is, just like the best human lover, a perfectly loving God (if 
those words mean anything) would never intrinsically desire any unnecessary delays 
in the beloved having their greatest attainable flourishing. Second, a perfectly loving 
God would always intrinsically desire any finite person to have their greatest attain-
able flourishing a.s.a.p. because it is good—rather than for its own sake.
In the next sub-section, I explain one necessary condition of any finite person 
having their greatest attainable flourishing a.s.a.p.
3 The Ferber method involves teaching infants to self-soothe by allowing them to cry for a predeter-
mined amount of time before receiving external comfort from caregivers.
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Premise (A2)
For Aquinas, and many other theists, there is some sort of strong connection between 
the existence of God and the existence of goodness—such that, at a minimum, God 
is the paradigm of goodness. Consequently, the proper object and cause of the two 
desires of love includes God and any finite person that exemplifies (God’s) goodness 
to some degree. As such, love is primarily the love of persons.
Relatedly, Aquinas thought it was perspicuous that the greatest flourishing for any 
person only attains in a union of love. A union of love is a special personal relation-
ship that requires the lover and the beloved to share significant personal presence, 
and thus, significant closeness (Stump 2010, Ch. 6). Accordingly, union with God is 
the greatest possible flourishing any person can have because it would be the great-
est possible union of love.
Moreover, according to Aquinas, the greatest possible flourishing for any per-
son is the most shareable form of flourishing because it is “not diminished by being 
distributed” (Stump 2010, 387). Accordingly, “…human loves can themselves 
be woven into the shareable love between God and a human person (Stump 2010, 
387).” Consequently, the greatest possible flourishing for any finite person is “more 
precisely described as the shared union of love among [all relevant parties] and God 
(Stump 2010, 387).” However, even this claim needs qualification because “…it is 
possible to have more or less [emphasis added] of a loving relationship in union 
with God [and all relevant parties] (Stump 2010, 390).”
Therefore, if a perfectly loving God exists who always intrinsically desires any 
finite person to have their greatest attainable flourishing a.s.a.p., then such a God 
always intrinsically desires any finite person to have their greatest attainable degree 
of union among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p.
Premises (A1) and (A2) jointly entail sub-conclusion (A3), i.e., if a perfectly lov-
ing God exists, then such a God always intrinsically desires any finite person to have 
their greatest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p.
In the next sub-section, I explain one necessary condition of any finite person hav-
ing their greatest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p.
Premise (A4)
According to Stump, if my adult cognitive faculties are functioning properly, then I 
will always grasp (on some level) the objective value there is in the world, including 
what morality requires. However, if I do not wholeheartedly desire to comply with 
what morality requires, then (on Humean externalism) I will always be somewhat 
motivated to perform actions that I know to be wrong.4 In that case, I will be some-
what divided against myself, or psychically fragmented:
I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I 
hate I do. And if I do what I do not want to do, I agree that the law is good…
4 King (2014, 215): “Despite being a cognitivist…Aquinas is also an externalist.”
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Now if I do what I do not want to do, it is no longer I who do it… (Romans 
7:15–17, NIV)
Unfortunately, my psychic fragmentation, or lack of internal integration around the 
good, prevents me from having the greatest attainable degree of union with others 
and myself:
To the extent to which a person is divided against himself, to that extent, he 
cannot be at one with others either. The lack of internal integration is therefore 
inimical to the union desired in love…even God cannot be close to a person 
and united with a person who is not close to himself…[Yet] closeness can be 
more or less rich…and in consequence…union itself comes in degrees (Stump 
2010, 127, 130, 390).
Therefore, anything that contributes to someone’s internal integration in goodness 
also brings them closer to God and all relevant parties. However, it is important 
to note that God cannot unilaterally eliminate my psychic fragmentation because 
a union of love requires two wills that share mutual personal presence and mutual 
closeness.5
Accordingly, if a perfectly loving God exists who always intrinsically desires any 
finite person to have their greatest attainable degree of union among God and all rel-
evant parties a.s.a.p., then such a God always intrinsically desires any finite person 
to attain the state of wholeheartedly desiring to comply with what morality requires 
a.s.a.p.
Premises (A3) and (A4) jointly entail sub-conclusion (A5), i.e., if a perfectly 
loving God exists, then such a God always intrinsically desires any finite person to 
attain the state of wholeheartedly desiring to comply with what morality requires 
a.s.a.p.
Assuming everything above is true, there remains the problem of how any psy-
chically fragmented person can attain the state of wholeheartedly desiring to comply 
with what morality requires a.s.a.p. In the next sub-section, I explain one necessary 
condition of Stump’s solution to this problem.
Premise (A6)
According to Stump, any psychically fragmented person can attain the state of 
wholeheartedly desiring to comply with what morality requires only if they have a 
sustained global second-order volition/desire for a will that wills the good:6
5 Later in the paper, I offer a response—by reasoning “from above”— to the objection that says, God 
would not have caused or allowed any finite person to be psychically fragmented in the first place.
6 If someone is currently incapable of forming a global second-order desire to be moral, for whatever 
reason, (e.g. environmental, genetic), then perhaps God: “…if he exists and is perfectly loving, will at 
some future point in that individual’s life, or in the hereafter, provide him with the capacities required for 
this and other forms of well-being (Schellenberg 2003, 24–25).” Finally, my argument leaves it an open 
question as to whether finite persons require divine grace in some way (or not) to form an ongoing global 
second-order desire to be moral.
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Paula’s second-order desire for a first-order desire not to eat meat…is predi-
cated not only on her desires as regards her own contribution to the ethical 
treatment of animals but also on her general higher-order desire to be an ethi-
cal person…So…all the more localized higher-order desires of the person 
being sanctified are predicated on a global second-order will for a will that 
wills the good…as long as a human person has a second-order desire for a will 
that wills the good, she will eventually have what she wants: a will entirely 
integrated in goodness (Stump 2010, 162–164).”
I hasten to add that Aquinas-Stump assume there is an immortal afterlife for all psy-
chically fragmented persons who continue to have the relevant global second-order 
desire—without ever permanently losing it. Otherwise, it would not follow that all 
relevant parties could eventually reach a state of being internally integrated in good-
ness; say, if they were forever annihilated from existence before they ever reached 
that state.
Indeed, given the possibility of moral backsliding and moral stagnation (at least 
in this life), it may only be in an immortal afterlife that all relevant parties can attain 
the state of wholeheartedly desiring to comply with what morality requires (Stump 
2010, 161). In that connection, it is important to note that “[i]t is possible…for a 
person to have a second-order desire for a will that wills the good and reject a par-
ticular reform that he sees as morally needed but that he finds himself unable to 
accept at a particular time (Stump 2010, 164).” Consequently, any finite person P 
is resistant (simpliciter) to union among God and all relevant parties, at any time 
t, only if P does not have a global second-order desire for a will that wills the good 
(hereafter: global second-order desire to be moral).
Thus, any nonresistant finite person can attain the state of wholeheartedly desir-
ing to comply with what morality requires a.s.a.p. only if their global second-order 
desire to be moral is optimally sustained. Therefore, if a perfectly loving God exists 
who always intrinsically desires any finite person to attain the state of wholeheart-
edly desiring to comply with what morality requires a.s.a.p., then such a God always 
intrinsically desires to optimally sustain any nonresistant finite person’s global sec-
ond-order desire to be moral.
Premises (A5) and (A6) jointly entail sub-conclusion (A7), i.e., if a perfectly lov-
ing God exists, then such a God always intrinsically desires to optimally sustain any 
nonresistant finite person’s global second-order desire to be moral.
In the next section/sub-section, I argue that if Humean externalism is true, then 
it can vary throughout the lifetime of any nonresistant finite person whether theistic 
or non-theistic resources in their nature or their environment optimally sustain their 
global second-order desire to be moral.
Humean externalism
Premise (A8)
Consider the following four claims (one from metaethics, and three from moral 
psychology):
 International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
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(C1) Moral judgments are beliefs.
(C2) Moral judgments are essentially motivating.
(C3) Volitions/desires are the ultimate source(s) of motivation.
(C4) There is no necessary connection between any belief and any volition/
desire.
Claim (C1) encapsulates cognitivism, the view in metaethics that moral judgments 
sometimes embody knowledge; and therefore, are states of belief. Claim (C2) encap-
sulates motivational internalism, the view in moral psychology that if an agent forms 
the moral belief that they ought to do something, then he or she will be at least 
somewhat motivated to act in accordance with that belief. On this view, beliefs and 
desires do not have distinct natures. Claim (C3) encapsulates Humeanism, the view 
in moral psychology that beliefs neither motivate nor generate any motivationally 
efficacious states apart from an agent’s volitions/desires. Claim (C4) encapsulates 
motivational externalism, the view in moral psychology that if any connection exists 
between some belief and some volition/desire, then that connection is contingent. 
On this view, beliefs and volitions/desires have distinct natures.
Here is the issue: many have found claims (C1)–(C4) plausible, but assuming the 
truth of all four claims leads to inconsistency.7 One way to avoid inconsistency is to 
reject motivational internalism (C2) and accept cognitivism (C1), Humeanism (C3), 
and motivational externalism (C4). In fact, the truth of cognitivism (the dominant 
view in metaethics),8 and Humeanism (the dominant view in moral psychology),9 
jointly entail motivational externalism.10
As such, let us discuss a standard alethic characterization of Humean externalism:
Explanatory Humean Externalism: Necessarily, whenever an agent engages in 
some action, x, the complete explanation of x must cite one or more of her 
motivational states as the ultimate source(s) of x, and one or more of her infor-
mational states as the efficient and final cause(s) of x (Swartzer 2015, 3–4).
Put simply; the complete explanation of an agent’s action must be the product of two 
different kinds of mental states: motivational states, and informational states.
7 For a demonstration of this inconsistency, see Brink (1997, 6).
8 Bourget and Chalmers (2014, 95).
9 Rosati (2016), https ://plato .stanf ord.edu/archi ves/win20 16/entri es/moral -motiv ation /:
 It would perhaps be fair to say that Humeanism continues to be the dominant view.
10 We can show this by letting ‘J’ stand for moral judgment, ‘B’ for moral belief, ‘M’ for motivation, and 
‘D’ for desire:
1. Necessarily, J iff B—claim (1).
2. Possibly, J & not-M—not-claim (2)
3. Impossibly, if J, then M. [2]
4. Necessarily, if M then D—claim (3).
5. Impossibly, if J, then D. [3, 4]
6. Possibly, J & not-D. [5]
7. Possibly, B & not-D. [1, 6]
1 3
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Volitions/desires constitute motivational states. Their strength can vary through-
out an agent’s lifetime, and they determine an agent’s ends and ‘drive’ him or her 
toward attaining them. Beliefs and other cognitive states constitute informational 
states. Despite lacking motivational force, informational states are invariably action 
guiding because there are usually a determinate number of ways in which an agent 
may act in accord with, or contrary to, her motivational states (Svavarsdottir 1999, 
162). Relatedly, the content of informational states can differentially engage and 
sustain an agent’s motivational states by telling them how likely it is that various 
actions might promote their ends (Swartzer 2015, 3).
Accordingly, the complete explanation of an agent’s moral behavior is “…a mat-
ter of contingent psychological fact, depending on both the content of people’s moral 
views and their attitudes and desires (Brink 1989, 49).” Fortunately, many people 
can avail themselves of widely shared and centrally rooted resources in their nature 
or their environment to harness and extend their grasp of what morality requires, as 
well as their desire to comply with what morality requires:
How we internalize norms, our experience of socialization, the way in which we 
learn to reason, our experience as religious [or irreligious] practitioners—these are 
the ways in which we undergo character development and fine-tune the [moral] 
capacities with which nature endows us (Flescher and Worthen 2007, 246).
As such, while it may be a contingent fact that most people have some grasp of what 
morality requires, as well as some desire to comply with what morality requires, it 
can be a widespread and deep fact about them. In this way, the Humean externalist 
can make her view compossible with Aquinas-Stump’s view that no sane person (in 
the actual world) is or has been wholeheartedly evil.11
Here is the crucial point: if Humean externalism is true, then it can vary through-
out the lifetime of any nonresistant finite person whether theistic or non-theistic 
resources in their nature or their environment optimally sustain their global second-
order desire to be moral.12 To see that this is so, consider three additional points 
about the resources in most people’s nature or environment that can function to 
11 Stump (2010), 139:
 .…Aquinas could accept the possibility of…a person who is single-minded and whole-hearted 
in evil—as long as he could judge such a person insane, in virtue of that person lacking the abil-
ity to discern by reason the objective value that is really there in the world. In such judgment, of 
course, Aquinas would not be dissenting from common opinion.
12 If Humean externalism is true, then my main argument is compatible with Aquinas-Stump’s theologi-
cal beliefs about faith and justification:
 …for Aquinas, there is implicit as well as explicit faith…some of those who lived before the 
advent of Christ or who live in places where Christianity is not known might nonetheless count 
among those saved by faith because of their right relation to God, the object of faith, even if they 
do not explicitly hold the articles of faith… (Stump 2010, 163).
 Moreover, if Humean externalism is true, then my main argument is also compatible with Aquinas-
Stump’s theological belief that grace is required for justification and sanctification. Why? Because 
the resources that operate individually or combine to cause or sustain any nonresistant finite person’s 
global second-order desire to be moral can be indirect gifts of grace, or direct gifts of grace.
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harness and extend their grasp of what morality requires, as well as their desire to 
comply with what morality requires.
First, these resources comprise six categories (each containing various subcat-
egories): psychological mechanisms,13 social mechanisms,14 moral reasoning,15 
non-moral reasoning,16 religious concepts and practices,17 and irreligious concepts 
and practices.18 Second, these resources are determinate and widespread in that each 
instance of nonresistant nonbelief/belief in the actual world embodies some permu-
tation of them. Third, on Humean externalism, permutations of these resources with 
different content might differentially sustain any nonresistant finite person’s global 
second-order desire to be moral (throughout their lifetime):
…the disposition to be motivated by one’s moral judgments is grounded in a 
conative attitude (desire) taken towards objects under a moral mode of pres-
entation. For convenience, call it the desire to be moral. I expect that it var-
ies from agent to agent which other mental states sustain that desire. In some 
cases, it may be sustained by a healthy dose of sympathy with others, as well 
as an acceptance of a norm of benevolence. In other cases, it will, instead or 
additionally [emphasis added], be sustained by a desire to be able to justify 
one’s conduct from an impartial standpoint. But undoubtedly, there are also 
cases in which it is sustained, say, by an awe of God and a theological view 
of the foundations of morality, or by a fear of punishment. It may also just 
stand there pretty much on its own, not dependent on any other motive at that 
stage in the person’s life. I doubt there is any unique psychology that sustains 
a disposition to be motivated by one’s moral judgments… (Svavarsdottir 1999, 
170–171).
Accordingly, Humean externalism does not entail that either theistic or non-theistic 
permutations of these resources, but not both, can sustain any nonresistant finite per-
son’s global second-order desire to be moral (throughout their lifetime). Instead, if 
Humean externalism is true, then it can vary throughout the lifetime of any nonre-
sistant finite person whether permutations of theistic or non-theistic resources opti-
mally sustain their global second-order desire to be moral.
Thus, a perfectly loving God might intrinsically/derivatively desire to promote/
permit permutations of theistic or non-theistic resources to optimally sustain every 
nonresistant finite person’s global second-order desire to be moral (throughout their 
lifetime). Moreover, if that were the case, then we would predict that, on average, all 
the relevant theistic and non-theistic parties would exhibit parallel levels of moral 
development across time and space. As it happens, when we survey the world as it 
13 E.g., sympathy, empathy.
14 E.g., group-level functional organization.
15 E.g., the informal ways in which we learn to reason morally (i.e., parents, culture, etc.) and the formal 
ways (i.e., normative systems of ethics).
16 E.g., logic.
17 E.g., concepts about the purpose of life, spiritual disciplines, etc.
18 E.g., Humanism, Existentialism, Reason Rallies, etc..
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is, and has been, all the available and relevant empirical evidence appears to confirm 
this prediction:
I see no [empirical] evidence [from history or scientific studies] at all that peo-
ple who profess to believe that there is an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic 
god are more virtuous than those who fail to profess to believe that there is an 
orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god…Given the variation in the propor-
tions of theists and non-theists, and the difficulties that face the ‘summation’ 
of goods and evils, I see no prospect of arriving at an uncontroversial answer 
to the question of whether, on the whole, those who have believed that there is 
an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god have been morally better than those 
who have failed to hold this belief (Oppy 2006, 357).
In that connection, all instances of nonresistant nonbelief/belief might exist or 
have existed to optimally sustain every nonresistant finite person’s global second-
order desire to be moral.
Therefore, (given the three points above) if a perfectly loving God always intrin-
sically desires to optimally sustain any nonresistant finite person’s global second-
order desire to be moral, then such a God might derivatively desire to permit various 
types and tokens of nonresistant nonbelief for some time.
Premises (A7) and (A8) jointly entail sub-conclusion (A9), i.e., if a perfectly lov-
ing God exists, then such a God might derivatively desire to permit various types 
and tokens of nonresistant nonbelief for some time.
In the next sub-section, I explain why premise (A10) might be true.
Premise (A10)
Recall, on Humean externalism, that desires determine an agent’s ends and ‘drive’ 
him or her toward attaining them. Accordingly, if a perfectly loving God deriva-
tively desires to permit various types and tokens of nonresistant nonbelief (as a nec-
essary means toward the intrinsically desired end of optimally sustaining the global 
second-order desire of all relevant parties), then such a God might be driven to be 
temporarily closed to union with all relevant parties.
Premises (A9) and (A10) jointly entail main conclusion (A11), i.e., if a perfectly 
loving God exists, then such a God might not be perpetually open to union with any 
finite person.
Objections
In the last two sections, I consider two objections to my main argument and then 
conclude the paper.
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First objection
If God created finite persons who start off wholeheartedly desiring to comply with 
what morality requires, then the greatest attainable degree of union would exist 
among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p. Therefore, if a perfectly loving God 
exists who always intrinsically desires any finite person to have their greatest attain-
able degree of union among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p., then such a God 
would not cause or allow any finite person to be psychically fragmented in the first 
place.
Response
According to Aquinas-Stump, if any finite person shares significant personal pres-
ence (in its fullest sense) among God and all relevant parties—and thus, significant 
closeness (in its fullest sense) with them as well—then that person has attained the 
greatest degree of union among God and all relevant parties. However, it is concep-
tually more plausible to believe that if any finite person has attained the greatest 
degree of union among God and all relevant parties, then they have attained fullest 
union (in the sense above) and deepest union with them.
Consequently, if a perfectly loving God exists who always intrinsically desires 
any finite person to have their greatest attainable flourishing a.s.a.p., then such a 
God always intrinsically desires any finite person to have their fullest and deepest 
attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p. In that con-
nection, here is the crucial point: only psychically fragmented persons who eventu-
ally attain integration in goodness, in a certain way (defended below), can have the 
fullest and deepest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties.
To see why, first recall that if any finite person does not wholeheartedly desire to 
comply with what morality requires, then they cannot have fullest union among God 
and all relevant parties.
Moreover, any finite person can attain their deep(est) union among God and all 
relevant parties only if the deep(est) act(s) of love feature(s) as prominently as possi-
ble in their union. In support of this conceptual truth, consider a deep union of love 
from J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring. In this book, 
the elf character named Arwen performs a deep act of love by voluntarily decid-
ing to give up her elven immortality so that she can marry Aragorn, the human she 
loves.19 To understand why this is such a deep act of love, it is important to know 
that in the Tolkien universe, if an elf marries a human, then both persons will even-
tually die. On the other hand, if an elf marries another elf, then both persons can live 
forever.
Given this background information, we can understand how Arwen’s act fulfills 
the two desires of love. That is, Arwen intrinsically desired union with Aragorn, 
where that union was also conducive to their true flourishing. However, she only 
19 Recall that the hiddenness argument includes any possible finite persons in its universe of discourse, 
including elves.
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derivatively desired the (mortal) conditions that were necessary to have union with 
him—conditions to which she consented. Therefore, we can say that Arwen’s act of 
voluntarily giving up her elven immortality to marry Aragorn is loving.
Here is the crucial point: the reason Arwen’s act is a deep act of love, and the 
reason that act features  so prominently in her marital union with Aragorn is the 
same; namely, she performed an act of deep(est) self-sacrifice that played at least 
a very prominent role in having marital union with her beloved. Notice that immor-
tal elves who are betrothed cannot have a deep union of love, in this way, even if 
they can have fullest marital union with one another. Analogously, it is hard to see 
how any finite person who starts off internally integrated around the good can have 
deep(est) union among God and all relevant parties, even if they can have fullest 
union among God and all relevant parties.
To begin to see why, notice that if any finite person starts off internally integrated 
around the good, then (on Humean externalism) that entails they start off whole-
heartedly desiring to comply with what morality requires. Moreover, if any finite 
person starts off wholeheartedly desiring to comply with what morality requires, 
then they would seem to start off with everything they need—internally—to obtain 
fullest union among God and all relevant parties. Furthermore, since a union of love 
requires two uncoerced wills, neither God, nor any other person, can obtain union 
with any finite person who starts off internally integrated around the good in virtue 
of external forces coercing them.
Accordingly, it is hard to see how God, or any other person, could perform some 
act(s) of deep(est) self-sacrifice external to any finite person who starts off internally 
integrated around the good, which might also play as prominent a role as is possible 
in them obtaining union among God and all relevant parties. Thus, it is hard to see 
how any finite person who starts off internally integrated around the good can obtain 
fullest and deep(est) union among God and all relevant parties.
On the other hand, psychically fragmented persons can have fullest and deep(est) 
union among God and all relevant parties, but only if (1) God or (2) all relevant par-
ties perform the relevant acts of self-sacrifice.
1. Suppose God performs some act(s) of deep(est) self-sacrifice that plays at least 
a very prominent role in one or more psychically fragmented persons attaining and 
sustaining internal integration around the good. In this way, God’s act(s) of deep(est) 
self-sacrifice would play at least a very prominent role in one or more psychically 
fragmented persons attaining and sustaining union among God and all relevant par-
ties. In fact, it is hard to conceive of some other act(s) of deep(est) self-sacrifice God 
could perform, which would play a more prominent role in any finite person attain-
ing and sustaining union among God and all relevant parties. Thus, it is hard to see 
how any finite person—who was not once psychically fragmented—could attain and 
sustain fullest and deep(est) union among God and all relevant parties.
Admittedly, however, I do not see how an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibe-
nevolent God could perform any self-sacrificial acts apart from the possibility of 
something akin to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Why? Because any-
thing an omni-God can do, she can do effortlessly, without deliberation, and with a 
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perfectly clear conscience.20 Fortunately, while my main argument provides us with 
abstract reason to expect something akin to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, 
it does not depend on the logical coherence of such an Incarnation.
2. To see why, suppose that one or more psychically fragmented persons perform 
some act(s) of deep(est) self-sacrifice that play(s) at least a prominent role in them-
selves or other such fragmented persons attaining  and sustaining internal integra-
tion around the good.21 In this way, some psychically fragmented person’s act(s) of 
deep(est) self-sacrifice would play a very prominent role in one or more such per-
sons attaining and sustaining union among God and all relevant parties. In fact, it is 
hard to conceive of some other act(s) of deep(est) self-sacrifice that any finite person 
could perform, which would play a more prominent role in any finite person attain-
ing and sustaining union among God and all relevant parties. Thus, it is hard to see 
how any finite person—who was not once psychically fragmented—could attain and 
sustain fullest and deep(est) union among God and all relevant parties.
Therefore, whether or not a perfectly loving God can perform any acts of self-sac-
rifice, such a God might always intrinsically desire psychically fragmented persons 
to become permanently integrated in goodness (in the way above) a.s.a.p.—so that 
they can have their fullest and deepest attainable degree of union among God and all 
relevant parties a.s.a.p.
Second objection
Doesn’t my main argument assume the seemingly contingent fact that a perfectly 
loving God would want to relate to finite persons who require a sustained global 
second-order desire to be moral? If so, then my main argument commits the famili-
arity fallacy after all because it is not entirely supported by abstract reasoning “from 
above.”
Response
Recall, in response to the previous objection, I argued that: if a perfectly loving 
God exists who always intrinsically desires any finite person to have their fullest 
and deepest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties a.s.a.p., 
then such a God might always intrinsically desire psychically fragmented persons to 
become permanently integrated in goodness (in a certain way) a.s.a.p. In that con-
nection, it is hard to see (on Humean externalism) how any psychically fragmented 
person can attain/sustain internal integration around the good without having some-
thing functionally equivalent to a sustained global second-order desire to be moral.
20 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
21 Of course, I am making two (plausible) assumptions here. One being that psychically fragmented per-
sons (e.g., embodied human beings) can perform some act(s) of deep(est) self-sacrifice that promote(s) 
the flourishing of all relevant parties. The other being that (at least) some psychically fragmented 
person(s)—myself included—would explicitly or implicitly consent to performing some act(s) of 
deep(est) self-sacrifice so long as it would be conducive to the greatest attainable flourishing for them-
selves or others.
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To begin to see why, recall that if any finite person attains/sustains fullest and 
deep(est) union among God and all relevant parties, then they probably must attain/
sustain internal integration around the good, in a certain way (already defended 
above). Also, if anyone attains/sustains internal integration around the good, in this 
way, then that entails they once were psychically fragmented. Therefore, if any finite 
person attains/sustains fullest and deepest union among God and all relevant parties, 
then they once were psychically fragmented.
Moreover, if any person once was psychically fragmented, then he or she once 
had at least some fragmented volitions/desires. Why? Because the concept of a per-
son entails having volitions/desires (Stump 2010, 93, 386–387, and 543). As such, 
if any person attains/sustains fullest and deep(est) union among God and all rele-
vant parties, then that entails they once had at least some psychically fragmented 
volitions/desires.
Furthermore, if any person who was once psychically fragmented attains/sustains 
internal integration around the good, then (on Humean externalism) anyone being so 
integrated will be a matter of certain internal relations attaining/sustaining among 
all their particular volitions/desires.
Here is the crucial point: it is hard to see (on Humean externalism) how all of 
one’s fragmented volitions/desires can be ‘driven’ to attain/sustain internal integra-
tion around the good apart from a general, or global volition/desire for all of one’s 
particular volitions/desires to comply with what morality requires. Therefore, since 
a global volition/desire for all of one’s particular volitions/desires to comply with 
what morality requires just is a global higher-order volition/desire to be moral, it is 
hard to see (on Humean externalism) how any psychically fragmented person could 
attain/sustain internal integration around the good without a sustained global higher-
order desire to be moral.
Consequently, it is not a contingent fact that a perfectly loving God always desires 
to relate to finite persons who require a sustained global second-order desire to be 
moral.
Conclusion
My goal here was to respond to Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument by drawing out 
a hitherto unnoticed intersection between the philosophy of love, metaethics, moral 
psychology, and the philosophy of religion. In particular, I hope I have shown that a 
perfectly loving God might not be perpetually open to a union with any (i.e., every) 
finite person if Aquinas-Stump’s account of the nature of love is true, and if Humean 
externalism is true. If my main argument is sound, then Schellenberg’s hiddenness 
argument might not show that atheism is true.
In closing, please recall the six categories of resources in most people’s nature 
or environment that can function to harness and extend their grasp of what morality 
requires, as well as their desire to comply with what morality requires. Since per-
mutations of these resources predictably constrain, but do not predetermine the con-
tent of the other mental states that might optimally sustain every nonresistant finite 
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person’s global second-order desire to be moral, the fundamental logic of my main 
argument can be harnessed and extended to help explain why (on theism):
(T1) the subjects of theistic experiences pursue a variety of radically different 
religious paths, none of which bears abundantly more moral fruit than all the 
others (Draper 2002),22
(T2) the world is religiously ambiguous, with no compelling proofs for or 
against any one religious or nonreligious interpretation of the world (Hick 
1989),23
(T3) there is no sensus divinitatis (Maitzen 2006),24
(T4) there is a diversity of views among humans about any purpose or role 
they may or may not have been created to fulfill (Trisel 2012),25 and
(T5) there are a diversity of views among humans about many moral issues 
due to widespread disagreement in the domain of normative ethics (Swinburne 
2007, 85).26
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